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A FTER THE INAUGURATION of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the nation's capital entered a period of frenzy known as the Hundred Days. Dill's 
primary role in the New Deal came in regard to the Communications Act 
of 1934 and in the battle for Grand Coulee in 1933. In his battle for the 
great dam, Dill had to contend with those who were opposed to the dam, 
both in his own state and in Washington, D.C., with those who were zeal-
ous for the dam but knew little of how things were accomplished in the 
nation's capital, and with a president who had far greater concerns than 
Grand Coulee. In 1933 Clarence Dill helped out-flank the darn's oppo-
nents, guided its supporters toward what was possible, and was the leading 
member of Washington's congressional delegation in gaining FOR's ap-
proval of the great dam. 
Dill's initial plan to secure the dam in March 1933 included incorpo-
rating it in an unemployment bill, but there were a number of possible 
ways to proceed. 1 However, he recognized the banking crisis paralyzed the 
nation and thus he exercised the virtue of patience in relation to Grand 
Coulee. This prudence and sense of priorities has been inaccurately cited 
as evidence the dam meant little to Dill. 2 He wanted the dam for many 
reasons: jobs, future development, long-term reclamation projects, and per-
haps most importantly, as a lasting monument to his own political career. 
Dill was vain and proud; the dam would be a fitting monument to any 
western politician. It is also likely that he hoped to gain financially from 
the project; and there is some evidence he used unethical means to profit 
from Grand Coulee. 3 
On Aprill Dill wrote to James O'Sullivan congratulating him on his 
appointment as executive secretary of the Columbia Basin Commission 
(CBC). The CBC, a creation of the Washington state legislature, purposed 
to guide development of the Columbia Basin and negotiate with the fed-
eral government toward that end.4 Dill cautioned the energetic and 
headstrong O'Sullivan that the nation's agricultural surplus meant that 
Grand Coulee could never win approval as a land reclamation program. 
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Only pursuing Grand Coulee as a public power project offered any chance 
of success. 5 
In April Washington's congressional delegation remained uncertain 
as to how to gain approval for the dam. Dill and Representative Sam B. 
Hill favored procuring Reconstruction Finance Corporation funds, thus 
avoiding the need for congressional endorsement. Both Dill and Hill told 
Albert Goss, master of the Washington State Grange and CBC member, 
that pressing Columbia Basin development as a reclamation project was 
sheer folly. Goss agreed, having come to that conclusion himself sometime 
earlier. 6 Dill and Hill also informed Goss the project would not become reality 
without the president's support. Goss stood amazed at the degree to which 
everything in the nation's capital awaited the president's personal approval: 
I can confirm what they say with reference to the President's approval. 
He holds this Congress in the hollow of his hand and they will take no 
action whatsoever except upon his request. I never saw anything quite 
like it. Therefore, I feel that our whole effort must be made on concen-
trating upon the President. 
The President is under the greatest pressure I have ever seen, and it 
is very difficult to get an appointment. There are so many very grievous 
problems pressing that all but the most important are being deferred 
until after Congress adjourns. Senator Dill feels confident however that 
he will be able to get an appointment soon, and I know of nothing to 
do except press for this appointment as soon as possible.? 
So FDR's support for the dam was crucial, and Clarence Dill had the clos-
est relationship with the president of anyone from Washington State. 
Fortunately for the dam's supporters, FDR had long been interested 
in hydroelectric power development, rural electrification, and developing 
efficient agriculture.8 Indeed, as governor of New York, FDR had led that 
state's fight for public power. In the course of the battle, he had come to 
believe that a well developed public power system must become a reality to 
be a "yardstick'' by which private power companies might be regulated.9 
Moreover, the president saw much of the West as a vast wasteland that, 
given cheap electrical power, irrigation, and transportation, might be used 
as an experiment in social and economic planning. It was with these things 
in mind that FDR, as the Democratic Party's nominee for president in 
1932, gave a speech in Portland in which he said "that the next great 
hydroelectric development to be undertaken by the Federal government 
must be that on the Columbia River." 10 The president favored Columbia 
Basin development in some form; it was now up to Washington's congres-
sional delegation and the CBC to move that interest from the abstract to 
the concrete. 
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Probably about April14 Dill saw the president briefly to provide some 
information on the Grand Coulee project. The material Dill gave FDR 
estimated the cost of the project at $450 million. Roosevelt said to Dill, "I 
didn't realize this dam was so big." The two men discussed the project for a 
while. Then the president said, "I've got to go to bed with this." 11 
On April 17 Roosevelt's secretary called Dill and asked him to come 
to the White House to discuss the dam with the president. Albert Goss 
accompanied Dill; Sam Hill would have been there but traffic delayed 
him. Upon entering the president's office, Dill shook hands with Roosevelt 
and noticed his unusually friendly manner. The senator sensed bad news. 
The president began to extol the virtues of the project but then slipped 
into reiterating all the arguments against the dam. Dill decided to risk 
reminding the president of his many promises to build Grand Coulee. In 
his memoirs, this reminder becomes a verbal beating. Dill wrote, "I was 
like Joe Louis raining punch after punch on his opponent." 12 In reading 
Dill's memoirs, one cannot help but gain the impression that he embel-
lished his argument with FDR. In a letter to Rufus Woods, Dill mentions 
his disagreement with FDR but makes much less of it than he did in his 
memoirs. Dill's account to Woods is probably fairly accurate; there was a 
brief disagreement, Dill probably worried he had gone too far, then, to 
Dill's relief, the president proposed a low dam that might cost only $40 
million. 13 
Albert Goss argued that a low dam would not control floods and 
would make the eventual cost of electricity too high. 14 The president stated 
he knew very little about the project, but had the impression it was too 
large to finance under the present circumstances. 15 Congress would never 
authorize the money. Goss suggested pursuing the RFC alternative, and 
FDR responded such a course might be wise. He agreed to assist in secur-
ing RFC funds in increments if the project could be approached in that 
way. The president's help was very much conditional. While Dill and Goss 
explored the RFC alternative, FDR wanted to see cost estimates of build-
ing the project in two phases-first a low dam, then a high. The president 
then mentioned his desire to do something for unemployment relief in the 
Pacific Northwest, remarking Grand Coulee might help in that regard. 
The meeting ended on that note. Dill left some information on Grand 
Coulee with the president. However, both men recognized FDR would 
commit to nothing until he had hard figures to study. 16 
Goss described Dill's response to the meeting as elation, but was him-
self a bit nonplussed at the president's reticence. Goss and Dill reacted 
differently to their meeting with the president because Dill had little 
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problem beginning Grand Coulee as a low dam. Thus, the meeting en-
couraged him because it demonstrated Roosevelt's sincerity about the low 
dam. Goss discovered Roosevelt's antipathy to the high dam only during 
the meeting. Dill apparently had not informed Goss of his previous con-
versation with Roosevelt, perhaps because he considered Goss's presence in 
Washington, D.C., as unnecessary and bothersome. The two men had little 
use for one another. 
Dill later suspected FD R had wanted to begin Grand Coulee as a low 
dam all along and thus had sought a working compromise at the April 17 
meeting. This was probably true. Though FDR felt great pressure to cut 
government expenses in 1933, several factors compelled him to build the 
dam. First, he had repeated his promise to build Grand Coulee Dam on 
numerous occasions, and not just to Dill. Ceremonies at Muscle Shoals in 
February were just the most recent occasion upon which he had men-
tioned damming the Columbia at Grand Coulee. Second, the public power 
issue was directly tied to Grand Coulee and the president had campaigned 
as a public power man. Roosevelt's detailed vision for regional develop-
ment of the United States was largely based on a systematic use of the 
nation's great waterways; public power formed the cornerstone of that us-
age.17 Third, the Pacific Northwest badly needed jobs; Grand Coulee would 
help a great deal. Finally, Dill's relationship with Roosevelt gave the sena-
tor access to the president and made FDR amenable to helping him. 
After the meeting, Goss advised Governor Clarence Martin that tele-
grams supporting the project were a waste of time; he needed hard figures. 
In response to Goss's request, O'Sullivan wrote on April20, "I have made 
tentative figures based on the knowledge of the cost, and believe we can 
put in the foundations of the dam and go as high as probably sixty feet 
above low water, for about sixty million ... it is my opinion that we could 
put in the power plant also for this cost, and that we could utilize the 
turbines that would be required for the high dam." 18 O'Sullivan further 
assured Goss that the CBC was not asking for federal government funds 
for power construction without having a market for the new power. The 
power would be sold, he asserted. 19 
O'Sullivan now made plans to travel to Washington, D.C., to present the 
Grand Coulee project to the president in detail. O'Sullivan, who possessed an 
encyclopedic knowledge of Grand Coulee, was the best man for this job. 
Moreover, everything seemed to hinge on the president's personal approval.20 
After a meeting with the president on May 2, Dill announced the 
government's tentative plan to develop the Columbia Basin. He explained 
the plan as it stood would not require congressional action and would cost 
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only about $60 million, exactly O'Sullivan's figure on the cost of the low 
dam. The RFC and Washington State's unemployment relief fund were to 
supply the necessary financing. In addition, a power district would be · 
formed in Washington to sell the power. The resulting contracts would 
then be used as a basis for the loan from the RFC. 21 
Most Washingtonians were euphoric at the news, but then Oregon 
punctured the mood. The Oregon congressional delegation, led by Sena-
tor Charles McNary, saw the president on May 4 in an effort to stop Grand 
Coulee and secure a Columbia River dam of their own. The Oregonians 
preferred developing the lower river rather than the upper. They reported 
to the media FDR's apparent support of their position. The Oregonians 
were under the impression there would only be one dam on the Columbia 
in the foreseeable future. 22 Though McNary may have believed FDR agreed 
with him, the president had told him to see Dill. 
Meanwhile, Dill, Goss, and O'Sullivan worked on the details of the 
Columbia Basin plan. It is important to note that at this time the project 
did not have the approval of the president. FDR had merely encouraged 
Dill and the CBC to work on the project, assuming it would be financed 
largely through the RFC. The Washingtonians were to bring him a pro-
posal in line with a multistage development of Grand Coulee at substan-
tially lower cost than originally projected. The key to developing Grand 
Coulee as an RFC project centered on the formation of a power district in 
Washington State that would contract for the sale of power and thus estab-
lish the necessary collateral for an RFC loan.23 
Hope for the president's approval of Grand Coulee Dam now rested 
on the financial attractiveness of the project and, some believed, Clarence 
Dill's influence with the president. O'Sullivan expressed the latter in a let-
ter to his secretary: "Dill can get us the dam if he really wants to, because 
of his influence with the President .... Dill can overthrow influence of 
McNary and Steiwer, Republicans, if he will strive hard enough. It is up to 
Dill, and if he feels that the people out there want this proposition bad 
enough, he will get us the dam. "24 
O'Sullivan's estimate of Dill's power was too strong, just as his expec-
tations of Wesley Jones had been too high. If FDR decided against the 
dam, as Hoover had, there was nothing Dill could do. However, the letter 
does accurately indicate that Dill was the lead man in the effort to gain the 
president's approval. 
Interestingly, O'Sullivan did not at that time care who got the credit 
for the dam, as long as it was built: "I am not giving out any publicity 
letting Senator Dill do it. We cannot forewarn opposition of our moves 
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and the more Senator Dill 'fathers' the dam, the more certain we will get it. 
He is powerful with Roosevelt. I would give him the whole state if he puts 
it over, as I think he will and soon at that."25 Dill believed he would as well, 
not so much because he was "powerful with Roosevelt," but because he 
knew the president wanted to build Grand Coulee. For his part, O'Sullivan 
continued to urge his colleagues in Washington State to create the power 
district that would handle Grand Coulee's electricity. 26 Though O'Sullivan 
was willing to give Dill credit for gaining Roosevelt's approval of the dam, 
at least in 1933, he did not particularly like Dill. 
Dill now discovered that if the project were to use RFC funds, Wash-
ington would have to come up with one-third of the total, or $20 million. 
He informed the president that Washington State simply could not raise 
that much money. Apparently undisturbed, FDR promptly responded it 
might be possible to finance the project through the $3.3 billion Public 
Works Administration package then working its way through Congress. 
After discussing the possibility of using PWA funds, Dill and FDR de-
cided the senator had better make sure that PWA funds could be used for 
power projects. To this end, Dill went to see Democratic Senator Robert 
Wagner of New York, chairman of the Senate committee responsible for 
the National Industrial Recovery Act, which included the PWA. Wagner 
referred Dill to Senator Carl Hayden, Democrat of Arizona, chairman of 
the Senate portion of the conference committee handling the bill. Hayden 
objected to including a vague reference authorizing dams; he feared oppo-
sition from those who did not want any more reclamation dams. But when 
Dill explained that all he wanted was a power dam, Hayden agreed to 
insert the words "development of water power" into the paragraph de-
scribing acceptable projects for PWA funds. These four words would even-
tually provide FDR the legal basis for beginning Grand Coulee. 27 
In mid-May, work on Grand Coulee proceeded on several fronts. Dill 
filed an application with the Federal Power Commission to build Grand 
Coulee Dam. 28 More importantly the Public Works bill passed Congress. 
The Columbia Basin Commission and the rest of the state ofWashington, 
even many former Coulee opponents from Spokane, now waited to see 
what Dill and FDR could come up with. James E. Ford, managing secre-
tary of the Spokane Chamber of Commerce, who was in Washington, D. C., 
advancing the cause of the dam, told the Seattle P.l., "The fight for the 
Columbia Basin Project virtually has simmered down to a one man propo-
sition. Senator C. C. Dill has undertaken the task of putting the project 
across they say and is doing excellent work."29 Ford's pursuit of the dam in 
the nation's capital is indicative of how the project had won over many in 
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Spokane who had preferred the gravity plan.30 Even Dill's longtime enemy 
William Cowles, publisher of the Spokane Spokesman-Review, now sup-
ported the dam. 31 
In late May, it appeared Grand Coulee had the president's confiden-
tial approval and would be built through Public Works Administration 
funds. But concern remained that FD R might change his mind. The CBC 
relied on Dill to avoid that pitfall.32 lt was not long before O'Sullivan and 
the other dam supporters could relax a little, at least privately. In the last 
days of May, Roosevelt sent a confidential letter to Dill endorsing the project. 
Although the president had not provided public support, nevertheless, 
O'Sullivan was ecstatic and even had warm thoughts for Dill. O'Sullivan 
predicted that upon their return to Washington State, he and Dill would 
"show those guys up who are trying to block this project."33 
Those opposed to Grand Coulee were a strange mixture of 
Washington's private power interests and public power supporters from 
west of the Cascades. Ralph D. Nichols, a Seattle city councilman, and 
James D. Ross, head of Seattle City Light (a publicly owned utility), were 
both advocates of public power but opposed to Grand Coulee. Times were 
tough for both the city and the utility. The Depression had reached its 
nadir and budgets shrank with each passing month. They were both afraid 
the massive Grand Coulee project would either provide cheap power to 
private utilities or allow the federal government to directly compete with 
public utilities to sell electricity. Moreover, Seattle had its own plans for 
more power production on the Skagit River. To Ross and Nichols, Grand 
Coulee seemed ill timed at best and perhaps completely unnecessary.34 
Of course, private power interests opposed Grand Coulee in an effort 
to protect their investments and profit margins. Roosevelt and Dill had 
specifically in mind the idea that public power projects would provide a 
"yardstick" by which private power rates could be judged and possibly con-
trolled. Private power advocates, often led by Spokane's Washington Water 
Power Company, argued that the Pacific Northwest already had an abun-
dance of power, that Grand Coulee's power would be enormously expen-
sive, and that the project's reclamation aspects would seriously undermine 
the administration's effort to take excess farm land out of production.35 In 
the summer of 1933, several newspapers advanced the private power 
argument, and Pacific Power and Light Company President Paul McKee 
declared that Grand Coulee would only add to an existing power surplus. 36 
In June the lower Columbia flooded in combination with a record 
high tide. River watchers feared the worst as warm weather threatened to 
melt snow, further swelling the turbulent river. The Willamette, too, 
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overflowed its banks and added to the Columbia's torrent. Still the dikes 
along the river appeared to be holding, though farmers patrolled them as if 
by doing so they could hold the river back. They could not. On June 14, 
dikes on the lower river's islands and banks crumbled away; the raging 
water swept crops and livestock into the sea. The weather bureau offered 
little hope for relie£ The rampaging river did not peak until June 21, a full 
week later. It was not one of the Columbia's great floods, but it reminded 
Pacific Northwesterners of the awesome power of the great river.37 
Dill now faced a crisis of his own. Ralph Nichols, in a Spokane speech, 
accused the senator of pushing Grand Coulee for personal gain. Nichols 
said Dill owned large amounts of land in the Columbia Basin. Dill re-
sponded to the accusation: 
Whether you said it, I do not know, and if you did say it, I have no 
knowledge of where you secured your information. I am sure you do 
not want to do me an injustice or tell anything that isn't true about me. 
For that reason I am writing you to say I do not own a foot of land in 
the Columbia Basin Project, that I haven't any real property in the world 
with the exception of my home in Spokane, some lots in Spokane and 
an interest in some property just south of Seattle. I never owned any 
Columbia Basin land but with one exception. A number of years ago 
someone induced me to buy a half interest in a 640 acre tract there 
with a view to raising wheat on it. We didn't raise wheat, we sold it, and 
I think I made a few hundred dollars out of the transaction.38 
Nichols wrote back to Dill apologizing for inaccurately claiming Dill 
had anything to do with land speculation in the Columbia Basin. He did 
not, however, correct his erroneous belief that the entire Grand Coulee 
project was the dream of avaricious land speculators. Later in July, Nichols 
also wrote a letter to former Governor Marion E. Hay, which was passed 
on to the CBC and read before that group. In the letter, Nichols apolo-
gized for inaccurately associating Dill's name with land speculation. How-
ever, shortly after his apology to Dill, Nichols wrote a letter to the widow 
of A. Scott Bullitt (Bullitt had died suddenly while serving as FOR's cam-
paign manager in the Northwest) in which he again associated Dill with 
land speculators. J.D. Ross also repeated this charge and ordered aides to 
look into the land records of the Columbia Basin to find proof of a scandal. 
Dill had no part in land speculation. Of course charges that Grand Coulee's 
supporters were a pack of land speculators were added to the arsenal of 
weapons private power interests brought against the dam. 39 
In mid-June, FDR informed Dill that Washington would have to 
come up with $377,000 for preliminary engineering work if the project 
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were to go forward. If the state raised the engineering money-which Dill 
believed could be taken from the state's $10 million relief fund-he felt 
certain FDR would "put his stamp of approval" on the project publicly. 
Grand Coulee plans at the time anticipated 30 percent of the project would 
be paid for with PWA funds, the rest would be borrowed from the PWA 
on a bond issued by the proposed Grand Coulee Power District. Contracts 
between Washington and the United States Bureau of Reclamation for the 
necessary engineering work were in preparation.40 
Opposition quickly arose to spending $377,000 in state funds on 
Grand Coulee, as did opposition to placing "the entire burden'' of the 
project on Washingtonians. But that opposition again came from private 
power interests and the uninformed: even under the plan outlined above, 
the state did not carry the "entire burden."41 
On June 16, Dill conferred with the president concerning Grand 
Coulee and informed him of the progress being made in the state's effort 
to raise the engineering money and create a power district. Dill also an-
nounced the FPC had decided to waive the sixty-day waiting period on 
the state's request to build the damY 
There were certain members of the CBC and other dam supporters 
who wanted the state to retain control of the project while borrowing fed-
eral money to pay for it. Albert Goss was one of those who preferred state 
control-even to the point of abandoning the project should the federal 
government take it over. However, Goss left the CBC in the middle of the 
battle and became federal Land Bank Commissioner. Though leaving the 
fight, Goss advised Rufus Woods to resist letting the federal government 
run the project.43 O'Sullivan and Dill thought this attitude foolish and 
short-sighted. Woods, however, agreed with Goss.44 
Dill returned home in late June to conciliate the project's friends and 
face its critics: 
I was amazed to learn that there are those who are trying to delay and 
prevent the building of this dam through insidious propaganda. They 
say we cannot sell the power. We need sell only 250,000 kilowatts. 
Some say there is more power being produced now than we can 
sell. Of course there is, and why? Because of the profiteering prices 
charged by the power trust subsidiaries that are paying dividends on 
watered stocks. Bring down the prices of power to what Tacoma pays 
with municipal ownership and we will increase power used in Wash-
ington by one hundred percent.45 
The senator also explained the details of the Columbia Basin project as it 
then stood. He emphasized there was no plan to make Washingtonians 
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responsible for a huge bonded debt. Rather, the federal government would 
provide the state's share of the money, using future power revenues as col-
lateral, while providing 30 percent of the necessary funds itsel£46 
The editors of the Spokesman-Review, having taken the time to study 
the plan, liked it much better. But WE. Southard and Rufus Woods still 
wanted Grand Coulee to be a state-controlled project and pressured 
O'Sullivan accordingly. The Spokesman-Review editorialists, however, would 
have no part of any plan, such as that of Southard and Woods, which 
placed the state's taxpayers on the line. The paper much preferred the plan 
Dill had explained to the press or outright federal building of the project 
such as was occurring in the Tennessee ValleyY 
After touring the flooded regions of the lower Columbia, Dill sat 
down with Governor Clarence Martin to map a strategy for procuring the 
$377,000 needed for preliminary engineering work. Dill told the people 
of Washington that the president's final approval rested on securing the 
$377,000 in engineering funds. After a meeting of the CBC, the governor, 
Senator Dill, and the State Emergency Unemployment Relief Commis-
sion, Dill announced that the necessary money would be forthcoming, 
taken from a $1 0 million state bond issue. That accomplished, the CBC 
signed a contract with the United States Bureau of Reclamation to do the 
necessary engineering work. Dill now proceeded to secure a contract be-
tween the federal government and an as yet unnamed state agency to build 
the entire project. He informed Washingtonians that the president had 
given his verbal assurance and would make his formal approval soon.48 
Nevertheless, influential people in the state remained opposed to 
Grand Coulee. Ralph Nichols wrote a lengthy letter to Dill detailing his 
opposition to any Grand Coulee project that meant the state's taxpayers 
had to carry part of the financial burden. Dill must have laughed to him-
self, as Nichols's objections bore no relation to reality-the sale of Grand 
Coulee's power was the only collateral being offered the federal govern-
ment.49 J.D. Ross also remained firmly opposed to the dam. 50 
Supporters of the project were ecstatic that work on Grand Coulee 
was actually going to begin. They decided to hold a groundbreaking cer-
emony at the site featuring all of the state's dignitaries. Dill turned the first 
shovel full of dirt to the applause of more than five thousand people and 
spoke briefly saying the credit for building Grand Coulee belonged to the 
people ofWashington who elected him to the Senate and to those wh(<) had 
worked so long on the project. But Governor Martin, O'Sullivan, and 
Judge Charles Levy said of Dill, "He has been the force that has put it over 
when the time came for it to be put over." 51 Even Rufus Woods, who had 
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opposed Dill in every election and called him a "near traitor" in 1918, said, 
''And now here I find myself following and supporting Senator Dill today, 
and ready to be a good bird-dog when he wants anything done. You've got 
to hand it to Dill, our Democratic senator."52 Again, the accolades for Dill 
were a bit too strong. He was not a "force" that put anything over on the 
president. He was a team player, a compromiser, as he had been his entire 
career. His access to the White House allowed him to keep Grand Coulee 
in front of a president already disposed to work with westerners and build 
the dam. 
Governor Martin also correctly cited the cooperative spirit, the spirit 
that had built the West, as the key ingredient that had gotten the project 
under way: " ... without a doubt the dam would now be built, because the 
President of the United States, Washington's Congressional delegation, the 
Columbia Basin Commission, and the Governor ofWashington were all 
working together, harmoniously and determinedly to put it over. He praised 
the work of Senator Dill as indispensable to the success of the project."53 
Publicly, Dill was a hero, though privately, Nichols continued his cam-
paign against the dam and Washington's senior senator. 
Though groundbreaking ceremonies had taken place, the prelimi-
nary engineering contracts had been signed, and a good amount of back-
slapping had gone on, the project had not received the essential final 
approval from the president. Dill himself was "confident President Roosevelt 
will provide funds to entirely complete the Columbia Basin Project as rap-
idly as possible," and he was personally so dedicated to the project he would 
"resign from the Senate or do anything else possible to further this great 
project."54 Dill returned to Washington, D.C., in late July to meet with 
federal officials concerning Grand Coulee. He met with Harold Ickes, sec-
retary of the interior and head of the PWA, Colonel A.W Waite of the 
PWA, Dr. Elwood Mead, head of the Bureau of Reclamation, and Daniel 
C. Roper, secretary of commerce. Later he met with Budget Director Lewis 
Douglas. Dill expected to meet with the president after all of the prelimi-
nary conferences were completed to seek final approval. 55 
While Dill was in Washington, Congressman Charles Martin of Or-
egon caused a wave of concern to sweep Washington State when he claimed 
Bonneville Dam had been approved and thus Grand Coulee was "off the 
books." Martin asserted Bonneville would supply the region's power needs, 
leaving Grand Coulee as a reclamation project with no need of reclama-
tion in sight. Moreover, consternation among Grand Coulee dam sup-
porters increased when Harold Ickes appointed Marshall Dana, editor of 
the Oregon journal, to be one of the regional advisors to the PWA with 
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authority over the Pacific Northwest. Martin's proclamation, combined 
with Dana's appointment, made it appear Oregon was besting Washington 
for federal projects. 56 
News from Washington, D.C., made spirits sag even more. The PWA 
board, assigned to pass judgment on Grand Coulee, became concerned 
there would be no market for the dam's power. Dill suspected private power 
interests had prejudiced the board; he wired O'Sullivan in Spokane re-
questing rebuttal information as soon as possible. 57 
Though Grand Coulee's enemies were legion, Dill had a few friends 
himself. The senator beseeched the president to encourage the Public Works 
board to give Grand Coulee immediate attention. The president agreed. In 
addition, O'Sullivan came through for Dill with data on the prospective 
market for the dam's power; then, as Roosevelt requested, Dill met with 
the PWA board on July 26. 58 The next day, Dill advised O'Sullivan the 
meetings had gone well and not to worry about Congressman Martin's 
"propaganda ... the President is behind us now."59 
Though Dill did not have time to be concerned with Martin and 
McNary, the Spokesman-Review used its sharpest pen on them: "In future 
dealings with these Portland interests and their bragging Congressman, 
Senators Dill and Bone and Governor Martin will be justified in taking off 
gloves and speaking bluntly ... the people must get behind Senator Dill and 
Governor Martin in their insistence that the Grand Coulee Dam be started 
as soon as plans are completed."60 
The Spokesman-Review need not have worried. Dill had managed 
things in Washington, D.C., nicely, in spite of the fact Harold Ickes had 
been opposed to the project, as had Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace. 61 
Wallace objected to Grand Coulee because of its long-term reclamation 
aspects. Nevertheless, after Dill met with the president on July 26, FDR 
instructed Ickes and the PWA Board to approve the project.62 
The Spokesman-Review's headline on July 28 ran, "Money Ordered 
Advanced After Dill Confers With President." The story went on to say in 
part: "This action was taken under specific instructions given by President 
Roosevelt after his conference yesterday with Senator Dill, which left the 
Board [headed by Ickes] no discretion but to follow orders."63 After his 
meeting with the president, reporters asked Dill for a comment. He 
remarked he was "delighted," but "never had any doubt the project would 
be approved." He went on to say Grand Coulee was just the beginning of 
a vast development of the Pacific Northwest, the "President has big plans 
for this development." Meanwhile, newspapers that had claimed "Dill couldn't 
deliver" were being ridiculed by papers with more faith (a Rufus Woods 
editorial in the Wenatchee Daily World blasted the Yakima Republic).64 
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Though Dill worked hard to see Grand Coulee built, and the news-
papers were flattering, it is too much to say that he "delivered" or in some 
way convinced a reluctant FDR to approve Grand Coulee for the simple 
reason that FD R wanted to build Grand Coulee all along. Dill's role was to 
present information, provided by O'Sullivan, to the various agencies, jump 
through the bureaucratic hoops, and keep an already supportive FDR in-
formed. Convinced of FDR's support, Dill was generally sanguine about 
the dam in the spring and summer of 1933. As he said, he never really 
doubted the dam's approval. He would be equally confident, while others 
were frantic, about the high dam. In 1933 if the president wanted some-
thing done, it was usually done. 65 
With the dam approved, Dill encouraged the Northern Pacific Rail-
road to build a spur line to the dam site so as to expedite construction.66 
Then a few days later, Dill headed west to Ohio to spend some time with 
his mother and then moved on to his home in Spokane. Upon returning to 
Washington State, Dill toured the countryside, explaining what Grand 
Coulee would mean to the Pacific Northwest and listening to pleas for 
help with smaller dam and reclamation projects. Some of these (i.e., the 
Roza project in Yakima and the Skagit project for Seattle) he had been 
working on for some time and would continue to pursue.67 
In mid-September, Dill returned to Washington, D.C., and met with 
the president to discuss Grand Coulee. The senator informed FDR that 
the state had taken steps to halt land speculation in the Columbia Basin. 
Roosevelt was very pleased, perhaps remembering such speculation deeply 
concerned Ickes. After the meeting, Dill assured reporters that funds for a 
town and a bridge at the dam site would soon be released. Two days later 
Ickes authorized the funds. 68 
Back in Washington State, members of the CBC worried that "flank 
attacks" might derail Grand Coulee. Indeed, the Washington Water Power 
Company argued in October 1933 that Grand Coulee should not be the 
cause of its losing the Kettle Falls site, and that federal construction 
amounted to an unfair subsidy. Frank Post, president ofWWP, called for 
the power sold from Grand Coulee to be priced at the true cost of produc-
tion and requested that the agency selling the power be required to return 
equitable taxes to the state. lfWWP retained its rights to Kettle Falls, the 
high dam at Grand Coulee could not be built because a high dam would 
flood the falls. Thus Grand Coulee's power production would be held in 
check.69 In light of such attacks, Ellsworth French urged Dill to push for 
authorization of five or six million dollars before Congress reconvened so 
as to put the dam on solid ground. This kind of concern plagued Grand 
Coulee until Congress formally approved the high dam in 1935.7° 
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Dill announced late in October that PWA hoped to make Grand 
Coulee an entirely federal project. The federal government possessed pow-
ers the CBC and Washington lacked. For example, it had superior powers 
of eminent domain. These powers enabled it to begin condemnation pro-
ceedings against lands to be used for dams and then begin construction 
without waiting for final adjudication of the suit.71 Yet there was serious 
opposition to making Grand Coulee a federal project. A.S. Goss and Rufus 
Woods remained staunchly opposed. They saw federal control as a disaster 
that would make Washington State subservient to the federal government. 
However, members of the CBC, including Woods, and Governor Martin 
eventually concluded that Grand Coulee could be built in no other way.72 
In early November, the Columbia Basin Commission met with Sena-
tor Dill and Governor Martin and signed contracts with the federal gov-
ernment that made Grand Coulee Dam a completely federal project. The 
entire project would be financed through PWA with the United States 
Bureau of Reclamation in charge of construction. Moreover, the federal 
government intended to maintain ownership of the dam. Dill immedi-
ately called for a comprehensive authority along the lines ofTVA to ad-
minister the Columbia River Basin. However, Ickes persuaded FDR that a 
regional authority for the Columbia River Valley was not necessary.73 
Though Dill lost that fight with Ickes, he won another one about the 
same time. A number of Washington's cities had proposed projects that 
depended on funding from Ickes's Public Works Administration. But Ickes 
hesitated to approve such projects for fear Washington was getting more 
than its share of the federal purse because of massive outlays for Grand 
Coulee. On November 16, 1933, Dill protested such treatment to FDR. 
The president directed Ickes to transfer the municipal projects in question 
to Harry Hopkins' Civil Works Administration. Dill's efforts meant that 
those smaller projects would be built and that 10,000 more men would get 
jobs in Washington State.74 
Clarence Dill kept his eye on Grand Coulee as the last year of his 
second term came to a close-as did some of the members of the CBC. 
James O'Sullivan and others pestered Dill with letters claiming the plans 
for the low dam were not adequate to allow the later superimposing of the 
high dam, even though the plans for the dam had just been changed to 
ensure that a high dam could be erected on the low dam at some future 
date. What O'Sullivan was really after, however, was initial construction of 
the high dam, or at least its foundation, rather than the low dam.75 In 
January Dill responded to O'Sullivan's entreaties: 
The Water Rises 127 
I do wish you would try to put a stop to this agitation about the foun-
dation of the low dam not being satisfactory for superimposing the 
high dam. Dr. Mead stated when he was in Spokane that the plans are 
being changed to make the low dam entirely satisfactory. I have just 
talked with him and he tells me the entire plans are being revised on 
that basis. Neither he nor I can understand why this agitation should 
have been started again. It causes a lot of mail for me to answer and 
only tends to arouse dissatisfaction out there regarding the work we are 
doing.76 
O'Sullivan answered Dill with a letter in which he asked the senator if it 
were not possible to get more money for the dam to make the low dam 
more compatible with the high dam. O'Sullivan was no politician and Dill 
attempted to explain the realities ofWashington, D.C., to him: 
My reasons for being so insistent that we avoid too much public discus-
sion about the high dam now is that another public works appropria-
tion is coming up in Congress and I am anxious to avoid any possibility 
of a limitation against the Grand Coulee. If those who are opposed to 
it, could make it appear that this dam is to irrigate more land [the low 
dam was only a power dam] now or in the immediate future, they might 
use that as an excuse to prevent expenditure of even the $63 million. 
I am sure we can get satisfactory plans for the foundations of the 
low dam but we must build the power plant and the dam for $60 mil-
lion. It is unthinkable to reopen this question for more money at this 
time. Once we get the low dam actually started and have the founda-
tion actually worked upon, you will find me just as aggressive for the 
high dam as you have ever been. I am simply trying to avoid pitfalls by 
keeping away from that discussion now and I must depend upon you 
and other friends of the project to help me. It is extremely important 
that we get the contract let early this summer so we can have a big force 
of men working when the President visits the dam site.l7 
O'Sullivan paid no attention. His love for the high dam combined 
with his concern for the details of the project blinded him to the realities 
of politics. He responded to Dill's letter with assurances that he was not 
"striking for the high dam now," then proceeded to do just that. He had 
the support of another engineer who claimed the low dam, as planned, 
would not be adequate to serve as a base for the high dam. O'Sullivan 
advocated using the $60 million to construct a firm base for the high dam, 
effectively abandoning Roosevelt's low dam idea.78 
Dill probably telephoned S.O. Harper, acting chief engineer of the 
project, because O'Sullivan soon received a letter from Harper explaining 
that the low dam was entirely adequate to serve as a base for the high dam. 
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Harper explained to O'Sullivan: "practically all the investment made at this 
time can be utilized to full advantage in the construction of the high dam."79 
In addition to Harper's letter, Dill wrote to O'Sullivan in another 
attempt to make him understand the political dynamics of the project. 
However, this time his frayed patience showed. 
I have read the letters of Mr. Morse and Mr. Darland [associates of 
O'Sullivan], and all I can say is that we simply must not attempt to 
change the $63 million allocation and we must build the dam to what-
ever height it is possible to build it with a power plant also for the $63 
million. If there isn't enough money to build it to a height of I ,085 feet 
[elevation], then build it to 1,060 feet; if not enough for that, then 
make it 1,040 feet, if not enough for that, make it 1,000 feet. In other 
words, we must have a dam and power plant for this money, and then 
get additional money for a higher dam at a later date. 
We want to get just as much foundation for the high dam in as 
possible, but once the specifications are made up for this low dam, we 
must go through with it and then if there is some loss when the high 
dam is built, that must be absorbed in the future. 80 
Dill had problems in the nation's capital as well. There were some 
minor hold-ups in calling for bids on the project, which required his time, 
but Mead and Ickes cooperated in solving the problems. However, 
O'Sullivan had become very agitated about the delays and sent a telegram 
to Dill advising he request the CBC to send a "resolution'' to Ickes. Dill's 
calm response no doubt caused an increase in O'Sullivan's suspicions that 
Dill was "not on board for the high dam."81 
O'Sullivan's long-term mistrust and dislike for Dill, exacerbated by 
their disagreement over the low dam specifications, now developed into 
hatred. In a letter to Ray Clark on July 5, 1934, O'Sullivan asserted there 
was a graft-laden effort to throw the main contract for construction of the 
dam to the Six Companies, one of the main contenders for the job of 
building Grand Coulee. Moreover, O'Sullivan associated his stand for the 
high dam with honesty, implying those favoring the project as approved by 
the government were grafters. O'Sullivan was also concerned the Spokane 
crowd would be "running the show" when the president visited later in the 
summer. O'Sullivan's letter to Clark reveals his state of mind: 
My job here is a hot spot. Lots of gravy mixed up in the Six Company's 
bid. Politicians, grafters, etc., are trying to horn in on Mason [a com-
pany competing with Six Companies for the main contract]. The issue 
between the high dam and the low dam is acute. My stand for the high 
dam and for honest bids has made things pretty warm for me lately. 
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WR. Jarrell, Secret Service Agent, Pacific Northwest, Seattle, Wash-
ington, seems to be the one who can tell the most about the President's 
trip. I wrote you about getting the different communities down there 
organized, and keeping Spokane from running the show. The same old 
game which was played for years is intended.82 
Two days later, O'Sullivan wrote to Rufus Woods, making more ex-
plicit his accusations. O'Sullivan claimed that Dill arranged for his long-
time associate and Spokane attorney Frank Funkhouser to meet with Sam 
Mason, head of the Mason Company. Funkhouser suggested to Mason 
that he could act as Mason's attorney in securing the dam contract. 
Funkhouser wanted $100,000 for this service. Mason wanted nothing to 
do with Funkhouser's scheme. O'Sullivan went on to claim that Dr. Elwood 
Mead, head of the Bureau of Reclamation, was trying to "throw the job" to 
the Six Companies. O'Sullivan also asserted that James E. McGovern, a 
member of the CBC from Spokane, was also attempting to unethically 
profit from Grand Coulee. 83 
Most of the charges O'Sullivan made were untrue or completely un-
substantiated. However, Harold Ickes, whose reputation for honesty was 
well earned, ordered an investigation of the Grand Coulee project in the 
summer of 1934. Agents Oscar Brinkman, C.E. Grier, and Roy Young 
submitted reports. Mead, Mason, McGovern, and the Six Companies were 
cleared of any wrongdoing; but Frank Funkhouser, a longtime Dill associ-
ate and Spokane attorney was certainly guilty of unethical conduct in re-
gard to Grand Coulee. Moreover, it would seem Dill was a party to 
Funkhouser's schemes. 84 
According to the investigations, Funkhouser signed a contract with 
W.E. Southard, an Ephrata, Washington, attorney and the representative 
of a number oflandowners in the Columbia Basin who hoped to sell their 
land to the federal government as part of the Grand Coulee development. 
The contract stated that Funkhouser was to receive 25 percent of Southard's 
20 percent of the money obtained for the landowners. Why would Southard 
sign such a contract? Funkhouser had led him to believe that Dill could 
influence how much the government paid for Grand Coulee land. When 
it became apparent that government appraisers were not going to allow 
bloated land appraisals to stand, Southard wanted out of his contract with 
Funkhouser. However, Funkhouser had another scheme to profit from 
Grand Coulee.85 O'Sullivan appears to have been right that Funkhouser 
approached Mason with the proposition that the attorney would use his 
influence with Dill to guide the contract for the dam to Mason for a fee of 
$100,000. Mason would have nothing to do with Funkhouser. O'Sullivan's 
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assertion regarding Funkhouser's schemes comes from an architect named 
Hargrove who worked for Mason. Hargrove, however, refused to make his 
testimony public. 86 
Nevertheless, the investigators concluded that Frank Funkhouser was 
engaged in unethical and probably illegal conduct, but gaining a convic-
tion was unlikely. There was no evidence Dill was a party to Funkhouser's 
activities. Thus when Elwood Mead wrote a summary of the investigation 
to Ickes he could write that Dill was innocent of any wrongdoing. 87 How-
ever, historians are not limited to what can be proven in a court of law; 
what may be insufficient to send a man to prison, may well point to prob-
abilities. Such is the case in regard to Clarence Dill and Grand Coulee. 
It seems probable that the financial possibilities inherent in Grand 
Coulee development were too great a temptation for Dill to overcome. He 
and Funkhouser had been friends for years. Funkhouser used Dill's name 
repeatedly over a long period of time. Word of such activity could have 
easily returned to Dill. Therefore, it does not seem likely that Funkhouser 
could use Dill's name in his Grand Coulee schemes without the latter's 
permission. What does seem likely is that Dill and Funkhouser had an 
unwritten understanding that Dill would receive some of the money 
Funkhouser managed to make off the senator's name. Ironically, Dill had 
Opening bids for Grand Coulee Dam construction at the Davenport Hotel, Spokane. 
Cheney Cowles Museum/Eastern Washington State Historical Society, Spokane, WA 
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little power to affect contracts or land sales. If the deals Funkhouser had 
tried to create had gone through, his clients would have been paying him 
for nothing. 88 
So Dill probably engaged in unethical conduct in a failed attempt to 
make money. It would be easy, and simplistic, to cast the senator in a villain's 
role and make his accuser, O'Sullivan, something of hero. But history is 
not so simple. Though O'Sullivan had many positive qualities-persever-
ance, single-mindedness, and a willingness to sacrifice himself for the sake 
of the project-he was also overly suspicious of anyone who did not agree 
with him. For this reason Mead wrote Ickes: "Reading these reports shows 
the wisdom of the department in divorcing Mr. James O'Sullivan from all 
the operations at Grand Coulee. It is not that he is dishonest, but he is 
unbalanced and apparently thinks he is the only righteous man connected 
with this development."89 O'Sullivan's motives were pure and his goal was 
the high dam, but his judgment concerning men and motives was weak. 
Dill occasionally allowed self-interest to overrule his better judgment, but 
he was a shrewd judge of political realities and men. O'Sullivan and Dill 
continued to clash over Grand Coulee. 
In the summer of 1934, O'Sullivan turned to selling "the president 
for the high dam on his visit."90 O'Sullivan's enemies, as he perceived them, 
were clearly Dill and McGovern, Spokane men who favored FDR's plan 
for the low dam to serve as a basis for the high dam: 
There are an amazing number of rumors regarding what the president 
will do concerning the high dam. Some of these indicate that he is on 
the verge of authorizing the high dam. However, the activity of Senator 
Dill and J. E. McGovern in securing control of all invitations would 
indicate an effort to keep the President from learning of the need of the 
high dam. It is particularly important that President Roosevelt should 
understand that the power trust is still working hard to defeat the high 
dam and that he should personally direct the Federal Power Commis-
sion and the Bureau of Reclamation to protect the power and water 
rights necessary for the completed structure.91 
O'Sullivan's errors and concerns in this letter reveal a startlingly mis-
informed and suspicious mind. He assumed the president was uninformed 
about the high dam when in fact both Dill and Goss had explained it to 
him, Dill on more than one occasion. He apparently had no understand-
ing of how cost dictated a low dam, not private power interests. Moreover, 
he associated Dill with those interests and believed the senator had no 
desire to build the high dam. Finally, he saw malevolence in the state's 
senior senator organizing a presidential visit to his state. 
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In early August 1934, FDR visited Grand Coulee. The ceremony 
featured all of the standard trimmings and speeches. Clarence Dill and 
FDR were the men of the hour. In his speech, Dill mentioned how he had 
brought the dam to FDR's attention, how the president favored a low dam, 
and how the project came to life. Then Dill graciously, and appropriately, 
gave FDR the credit for building the dam. 92 Indeed, throughout his long 
life, in both public and private, Clarence Dill would often give FDR the 
lion's share of the credit for Grand Coulee. In Dill's mind existed two ver-
sions of how Grand Coulee came about. In one, Dill was the man who 
won the dam from a reluctant president who owed him a favor. In the 
other, FDR's leadership and vision made Grand Coulee a reality. 93 Which 
story one got from Dill probably depended upon how the question was 
asked. That Dill could hold seemingly contradictory ideas about the origin 
of Grand Coulee Dam is not surprising, for he held a number of appar-
ently conflicting ideas, values, and dreams. 
Shortly after the celebration, O'Sullivan wrote this letter to Ray Clark: 
I think you are right in saying that a showdown is very near at hand. 
The gang here have been framing me. McGovern, assisted by 
Funkhouser and Dill, grabbed control of the President's reception. This 
gang here secured the publicity from Washington D.C. stating that the 
commission was through and that I was offensive. They tried to keep 
any information about the high dam or reclamation from getting to 
the President. They have suppressed all publicity about the Soap Lake 
meeting, which was the biggest event of all. I showed the President all 
of the exhibits of Columbia Basin products and then introduced my-
self He said, "You do not have to introduce yourself, O'Sullivan, I 
know all about you. You have done wonderful work for this project and 
you will have my support in carrying on your work." He said that loudly 
in the presence of Senators Bone and Dill and a number in the audi-
ence. Senator Ronald writes me that he has learned disquieting things 
in Olympia. The plan was to oust me at the next meeting of the com-
missiOn. 
The real issue is whether we are going to get the high dam or the 
low dam. I am in close touch with the secret service, and believe me, 
they have got McGovern, Dill, Funkhouser, and that gang tabbed .... 
McGovern, Dill and Funkhouser plan to shut me out entirely. I 
forced them to have the President's car stop at the exhibit at Soap Lake. 
All the boys cooperated fine in getting out banners, ribbons, etc. on the 
high dam. We actually sold Roosevelt on the high dam and on reclama-
tion in spite of them .... 
The administration knows of the efforts of the gang to keep any in-
formation regarding reclamation and the high dam from him 
[Roosevelt]. I can say that I stand ace high with Ickes and the President.94 
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It is ironic that O'Sullivan would claim to stand "ace high" with Ickes, 
who would have never built the dam had it been up to him.95 This letter 
also mentions the complete fiction, so often repeated, that banners on the 
roadside combined with O'Sullivan's efforts on the day of the celebration, 
convinced FDR to build the high dam.96 The truth is Clarence Dill and 
FDR always intended to build the high dam; only O'Sullivan's imagina-
tion concocted a different scenario. Moreover, if FDR had not been in-
clined to build the high dam, roadside banners would not have convinced 
him to build it. However, Ickes, who accompanied FDR on this trip, and 
had long held reservations about the whole project, admitted that the sheer 
grandeur of the landscape and potential of the project caused him to be-
come a supporter of the high dam.97 
In the 1930s, there was no doubt as to who had led the Washington 
congressional delegation in gaining federal approval of the dam. Clarence 
Dill was a hero in the eyes of most people and easily the most popular 
political figure in the state. Even WH. Cowles sought to make his peace 
with the senator. Hearing he was considering retirement in 1934, Cowles 
visited Dill in Washington, D.C., and expressed his intention to publicly 
support the Democrat's return to the Senate so that he could watch over 
the dam. Dill rejected Cowles's offer. 98 
Though Dill was a hero in the thirties, history has not been kind to 
him in regard to his role in building Grand Coulee Dam. George Sundborg's 
Hail Columbia gives most of the credit to James O'Sullivan, from whose 
papers Sundborg's book is almost exclusively drawn. Sundborg's disparag-
ing view of Dill is essentially O'Sullivan's. 99 Rumors of Dill's attempts to 
make money on Grand Coulee would not go away and they hurt him 
when writers like Sundborg assessed his work for the dam. Later accounts 
of how the dam gained approval unfortunately followed Sundborg's lead 
and de-emphasized Dill's role. The primary problem with works that focus 
on the lengthy local battle for Grand Coulee is that they do not explain 
adequately how this local campaign turned into a federal project. The ob-
vious link between the local interests and the federal government-
Washington's senior senator-was ethically distasteful both to the principles 
of the time and later historians. Correspondence between the dam's major 
backers contain references to Dill's unethical activities and also make clear po-
litical animosities. I suspect historians could not reconcile the rumors of Dill's 
avarice and his unpopularity amongst Grand Coulee supporters, with an 
important role in securing the dam. Unfortunately, the United States has 
had no shortage of politicians who have performed vital public service while 
attempting to enrich themselves. History is seldom clean and neat. 100 
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Clarence Dill was Washington State's key figure in the effort for Grand 
Coulee Dam in 1933 and 1934. 101 Dill's access to the president allowed 
him to present FOR with information that helped maintain FOR's com-
mitment to the project. But Dill would have had little with which to im-
press the president had it not been for the countless hours of work devoted 
to the project over the previous fifteen years. Even the fight between the 
pumpers and gravity plan supporters had not been entirely in vain, as it 
allowed a consensus to form for Grand Coulee, even in Spokane. 
There were several men without whom the project would have been 
difficult to achieve; four were essential: James O'Sullivan-who sacrificed 
himself for years to see the dam built and who provided Dill with the facts 
he needed to convince FOR that the dam could be built at a reasonable 
cost; Rufus Woods-who consistently publicized and supported the great 
project to keep the dream alive; Clarence Dill-who possessed the politi-
cal office and personal relationship necessary to bring the project to FOR's 
attention; and most importantly, Franklin Roosevelt, who had the vision 
and authority to order the dam built. 102 The efforts of these men, and 
those of their supporting cast, contrast the myth of the West's individualist 
base to reality: despite their differences, these men cooperated to help build 
the West. Moreover, the building of Grand Coulee Dam is one of the key 
developments in the region's history: Grand Coulee and the dams that fol-
lowed provide the power for the modern Pacific Northwest. 
Grand Coulee Dam construction in the 1930s. Cheney Cowles Museum/Eastern Washing-
ton State Historical Society, Spokane, WI! 
